|
|
|
| Registros recuperados: 87 | |
|
|
| Karp, Larry S.. |
| We model the situation where two large countries impose either tariffs or quotas and a third large country remains passive. The introduction of the third country overturns results from two-country models. Stable quota equilibria are capable of reproducing the equilibrium price under tariffs, and Nash equilibria with quotas can result in positive amounts of trade. Using a linear partial equilibrium model, we show that world welfare may be higher under Nash quotas than under Nash tariffs. However, simulation results suggest that tariffs are likely to result in higher welfare than quotas. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Tariffs and quotas; Nash equilibria; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 1988 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51250 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Karp, Larry S.. |
| This paper attempts to provide a balanced view of the neoclassical economists' perspective on trade liberalization, with an emphasis on the agricultural sector. I review the basic arguments in favor of competitive markets in general and free trade in particular. These arguments are based on restrictive assumptions which often fail to hold. Under more realistic assumptions, the arguments in favor of free trade are invalid. Economists remain skeptical of the benefits of trade restrictions, but this is a nuanced judgment, rather than a theoretical certainty. I describe a number of situations where market failures imply that trade restrictions can improve efficiency. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6242 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Karp, Larry S.; Zhao, Jinhua. |
| A reform to the Kyoto Protocol that allows signatories to pay a fine instead of meeting the target level of abatement would achieve three goals. First, it would defuse one U.S. objection to the agreement: the concern that the cost of achieving the target might turn out to be extremely high. Second, unlike other cost-reducing measures (such as trade in pollution permits) it would increase the equilibrium number of signatories in a non-cooperative participation game. Third, it would make it easier to force signatories to comply with their obligations. We study the participation game under an escape clause using both a Nash Equilibrium and the concept of a stable set when nations are “farsighted”. We compare our results to a prominent model of International... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6857 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Karp, Larry S.; Sacheti, Sandeep; Zhao, Jinhua. |
| We use a North-South model with property right differences and resource dynamics to study the effects of trade on resource use and welfare. Autarky is likely to Pareto-dominate free trade in the long run when the environment is quite fragile, and the result is reversed when the environment is quite resilient. Trade may cause an environmentally poor country to drag down" its richer trading partner; in this case, both countries degrade their stocks when these would be preserved under autarky. Alternatively, trade may enable the environmentally richer country to pull up" its partner; in this case both countries preserve their stocks when these would be degraded under autarky. These results rationalize the positions of environmentalists and free-traders. The... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; D5; F1; O2; Q2. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25042 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Karp, Larry S.. |
| If a durable good monopolist produces at constant marginal costs and the good depreciates, there exists a family of Strong Markov Perfect Equilibrium (SMPE) with an infinitesimal period of commitment. One member of this family entails instantaneous production of the level of stock produced in a competitive equilibrium; this is consistent with the Coase Conjecture. Other SMPE in the family entail steady state production at a stock level lower than in the competitive equilibrium. In these equilibria, there may be a jump to the steady state, or the steady state may be approached asymptotically. Monopoly profits are positive in these equilibria, and the Coase Conjecture fails. We contrast this result to other papers which use non-Markov strategies to construct... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coase Conjecture; Depreciation; Multiple Markov Equilibria; Industrial Organization; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D42; L12; Q39. |
| Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6115 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Karp, Larry S.; Tsur, Yacov. |
| A constant social discount rate cannot reflect both a reasonable opportunity cost of public funds and an ethically defensible concern for generations in the distant future. We use a model of hyperbolic discounting that achieves both goals. We imbed this discounting model in a simple climate change model to calculate “constant equivalent discount rates” and plausible levels of expenditure to control climate change. We compare these results to discounting assumptions and policy recommendations in the Stern Review on Climate Change |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7192 |
| |
| Registros recuperados: 87 | |
|
|
|
